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9 EDITORS' PREFACE 0
In this second issue of Volume 22, Mr. James L. Hildebrand pro-
vides a perceptive analysis of the heuristic and "parental" functions
of law in the Soviet Union's sociolegal system. Basing his analysis
on both the unidirectional and the interactional aspects of these
legal roles, Mr. Hildebrand surveys the manifestations of the
opinion-creating and educational functions of law in the Soviet
Union.
In the second article, Miss Judith C. Areen offers an enlightened
view of public aid to nonpublic schools. The author reviews the as-
sistance programs of several states which have attempted to aid pa-
rochial schools without violating the Supreme Court's neutrality re-
quirements. It appears that some of the programs formulated to meet
these requirements may draw the states into "excessive entanglement"
with the church, a posture expressly proscribed by the Court in a re-
cent decision upholding state tax exemptions for churches. Miss
AKeen suggests that the uncertainty surrounding aid to nonpublic
schools could be resolved if the Court would set down broader
standards for permissible aid, designed to insure the availability of
quality education to all children, regardless of their religious prefer-
ence, socioeconomic status, or geographic location.
Mr. Robert Dugan, in his commentary on standing to sue, offers
a practical criticism of the injury in fact doctrine as it is presently
applied by the courts. Mr. Dugan believes that, in the absence of a
more precise definition of injury in fact, the primary advantage
claimed for the doctrine - satisfaction of the case or controversy
requirement without anticipation of the merits - will not necessarily
be realized in all applications of the new test. Moreover, the author
finds that in instances where the doctrine has averted an anticipation
of the merits, the courts have often turned to the complainants' pro-
cedural shortcomings in order to limit the number of fully adjudicated
cases and bar seemingly nonmeritorious suits.

